The Court may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness: Supreme Court of India

The Supreme Court adjudicated on an appeal filed by the accused who was convicted under section 304 of IPC and revived the sentence from 10 years imprisonment to life imprisonment and also changed the section under which he was convicted to 302 IPC.

In the instant case a man from the Naik community and a girl, from the Lingayat community, were in love. Being from different castes and apprehending opposition to their marriage by the family of Shilpa, they decided to elope and got married in 2002. They got their marriage registered before the Sub-Registrar, Hospet in 2003. Eventually, the couple returned to their village Taranagar to stay with the parents of the man. When this marriage came to the knowledge of girl's father, the accused, he bitterly opposed the same and reportedly berated the man's father and his family on several occasions, stating that they had brought down the honour of his family and that he would “finish” his daughter for marrying into a lower caste.

In the days leading up to the alleged incident, Shilpa was pregnant (around nine months).
The accused absconded after the incident but was later arrested after 20 days.

During the trial, prosecution led evidence of 25 (twenty five) witnesses including the experts. The eye witnesses who had arrived at the spot of the incident turned hostile with the exception of the father in law of the girl, whose testimony has been found to be truthful and reliable by the High Court.

The Sessions Court had earlier, acquitted the accused on the ground that mere intent on the part of the accused to commit the crime was not sufficient to record a finding of guilt. The Sessions Court discarded the evidence of the lone witness. It held that the evidence was replete with improvements on her previous statement and was unreliable. Further, the circumstantial evidence was not enough to convict the accused.

In appeal by the State, the High Court accepted the prosecution’s case that the accused was a frustrated father because of his daughter having married to the man who belonged to lower caste and was the motive to commit the crime. Further, even if there was a little exaggeration of the events by the witness during the evidence, the same could be ignored and that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the accused. The High Court also relied on the post mortem report and serology report which stated that blood stains on the sickle matched with those on the clothes of the deceased. The High Court recorded a finding of guilt against the appellant but went on to convict the appellant for offence under Section 304 Part I of IPC and sentenced him to 10 years of imprisonment. This order of conviction and sentence has been challenged by the appellant.

The supreme court observed that "In the present case, the evidence has been corroborated by other circumstances and prosecution evidence. That leaves no manner of doubt that the accused not only had strong motive to kill his daughter but was responsible for doing so and excludes the probability of someone else being responsible for the death of deceased. Taking overall view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the finding of guilt recorded against the accused (appellant) by the High Court is unexceptionable and does not warrant any interference."

The Apex court also quoted the portion of High Court's Judgement and stated that "it is evident that the High Court has made no attempt to explain as to how the case on hand would be covered by one of the five exceptions given in Section 300 of IPC. Unless the case falls under one of the specified exception, it cannot be brought under first part or second part of Section 304 of IPC.
The first exception will be attracted only if it is possible to hold that the accused whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, caused death. From the established facts on record, it is seen that the accused followed his daughter into the women’s public toilet of the village and assaulted her."

Suffice it to observe that none of the exceptions in Section 300 of IPC is attracted in the present case. It would necessarily follow that the accused committed murder of his daughter who was in the advanced stage of pregnancy and for which he was liable to be punished with either imprisonment for life or death under Section 302 of IPC alone.

One cannot be a beneficiary of his own wrongs: Supreme Court

Supreme Court decided on a crucial case of custody of a child between the divorced couple and pronounced the judgement in the favor of the Father. While deciding the matter the court observed various factors and circumstances of the case. The Court stated that "it becomes, at times, a difficult choice for the court to decide as to whom the custody should be given. No doubt, paramount consideration is the welfare of the child. However, at times the prevailing circumstances are so puzzling that it becomes difficult to weigh the conflicting parameters and decide on which side the balance tilts".

The couple married sometime in the year 1999. They lived in Faridabad for a short while and thereafter the couple shifted to U.K. soon. A girl child was born to them in the U.K. Soon after when their relationship did not go well, they filed divorce petition in the court of U.K and around the same time the man who had shifted to India also obtained the decree of divorce in Indian court. The girl remained with the father since the legal battle started and the court also decided the matter in his favor.

The case came up before the Supreme Court when the couple's daughter, Vaishali, was 11 years of age, the Bench (comprising of Aftab Alam and Ranjana Prakash Desai, JJ.) decided to meet Vaishali in order to interact with her to ascertain her view point. After meeting her the bench passed the order which stated “In the proceedings held on January 31, 2013, it was agreed between the parties and was also noted in the order passed on that date that the child Vaishali should stay with respondent No.1 (Sukriti Arora), the mother of the child at her residence in Delhi for one month under monitoring by this Court. In continuation of that order, therefore, we direct that Vaishali should stay with her mother, tentatively for one month from today, subject to any further direction that may be passed by this Court in the meanwhile. Ms. Madhavi Divan, one of the counsel representing the petitioner shall hand over the child to her mother-respondent No.1 outside the court room after we complete the passing of this order. Respondent No.1 shall deposit her passport with the Registrar (J-III) of this Court which shall be returned back to her after Vaishali goes back to her father on completion of the term of her stay with respondent No.1. We are informed that Vaishali's school is reopening from April 4, 2013. On behalf of Respondent No.1, it is stated that she will ensure that the child reaches the school in time and is brought back to her residence after school hours. The child's stay with her mother will, in no way, affect her attendance at the school or her studies.

During her stay with the mother, the child will be free to speak to her father on telephone. On behalf of respondent No.1, it was stated that she would not create any obstruction in the way of the child speaking to her father. During the child's stay with her mother, we would like some responsible and competent person to monitor the arrangement. We, accordingly, request Mrs. Sadhana Ramachandran, who works for the Delhi High Court Mediation and Conciliation Centre, to monitor the arrangement on behalf of this Court. Mrs. Ramachandran shall visit the mother and the child at the address noted above on a date and time of her convenience. She would inform respondent No.1 on her mobile phone about the proposed date and time of her visit to the respondent's place. She would see how the relationship between the child and the mother is developing and if need be, she would counsel both the child and the mother. If the father wants to visit the child while she is staying with her mother, he may do so at a time when Mrs. Sadhana Ramachandran is also present there. For the purpose of the visit he will have to take the necessary permission from Mrs. Ramachandran. It is submitted on behalf of Respondent No.1 that she would like to take the child to some resort or some hill station for a brief holiday. We would like the mother and the child to stay in Delhi itself but, in case, both the child and the mother together wish to go outside, they may do so subject to the permission in writing taken from Mrs. Ramachandran. Mrs. Ramachandran would submit a report to this Court within ten days from today. Let this matter be listed for further direction along with the report from Mrs. Ramachandran on April 12, 2013.”

The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 lays down the principles on which custody disputes are to be decided. Section 7 of this Act empowers the Court to make order as to guardianship. Section 17 enumerates the matters which need to be considered by the Court in appointing guardian and among others, enshrines the principle of welfare of the minor child. This is also stated very eloquently in Section 13.

The appellant argued that the child is living since long with the father. The court in response to the argument stated that "The argument is attractive. But the same overlooks a very significant factor. By flouting various orders, leading even to initiation of contempt proceedings, the appellant has managed to keep custody of the child. He cannot be a beneficiary of his own wrongs. The High Court has referred to these aspects in detail in the impugned judgments.”

Read the full judgement here.

Case Study:{ STATE OF KARNATAKA V/S SELVI J. JAYALALITHA & ORS } IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Appeals project a challenge to the judgment and order dated 11.5.2015 rendered by the High Court of Karnatka in the appeals preferred by the respondents herein, thereby acquitting them of the charge under Sections 120B and 109 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”) read with Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short “1988 Act”) as framed against them and also resultantly setting-aside the order of the Trial Court for confiscation of properties, both movable and immovable, of the concerned firms, as mentioned therein. In the meantime, after the conclusion of the arguments, the respondent No.1 expired and, thus in law, the appeals against her have abated. Nevertheless, in view of the gamut of the imputations and the frame-work of the charges as well as the nature of the evidence, oral and documentary, available on records, reference to her role and involvement, based thereon in collaboration with other respondents would have to be essentially examined. The respondents-accused would hereinafter be referred to as respondents/accused/A1/A2/A3/ A4, as the case may be, contingent on the context.read more

The Trial Court after analyzing oral and documentary evidence came to the conclusion that the accused have not disputed the loan transactions and as a result whereof it held that the prosecution has proved Item Nos.1 to 8 of AnnexureIV. In respect of Item Nos.9 to 21, the Trial Court after duly considering the evidence, both oral and documentary, held that the accused did not dispute the statutory permission obtained by them for constructing new buildings and addition of the building as noted in Exts.65, 64, 51, 54, 63, 56, 48, 49, 50, 59, 60, 61, 62, 66 and 76, respectively and therefore, it appeared that the receipts for such payments and the proceedings maintained by the concerned municipal authority had been established by the prosecution. Similarly, the Trial Court held that payments made with respect to item Nos.23 to 35, 37 to 44, 46, 48 to 54 & 56 to 176 had been proved by the prosecution. The corresponding documents have already been accepted before the Court and hence such expenditure has been proved by the prosecution. With regard to Item Nos.178 to 198, such expenditures were never disputed on behalf of the accused before the Court. After analyzing the evidence of  the prosecution witnesses and their depositions, it held that item Nos.229 & 230 have also been proved by the prosecution.

The Trial Court has duly considered the objections raised on behalf of the accused and rejected the same. Similarly, the Trial Court has also dealt with other expenditures such as household expenses (Item No.225 in the Chart) and the objections raised on such account on the ground of overlapping entries and it came to the conclusion that the argument of the learned counsel raising the objections cannot be accepted. After analyzing the oral and documentary evidence placed on record and the judgments cited before it, the Trial Court came to the following conclusion: “Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that as against the income of Rs.9,91,05,094.75 and expenditure of Rs.8,49,06,833.00 during the check period, A1 acquired and possessed in her name and in the names of A2 to A4 and in the names of the business enterprises acquired in their names immovable properties and pecuniary resources of the value of Rs.53,60,49,954.00 which she could not satisfactorily account. Hence, acting u/Sec. 248 (2) of 896 Spl.C.C.208/2004 Cr.P.C., A1 is hereby convicted for the offence punishable u/Sec. 13 (1) (e) R/w. Sec. 13 (2) of 1988 Act.
Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that, A1 to A4 were parties to criminal conspiracy with the object of acquiring and possessing pecuniary resources and assets to the extent of Rs.53,60,49,954.00 beyond the known source of income of A1. Hence, A1, A2, A3 and A4 are hereby convicted for the offence punishable u/Sec. 120-B of I.P.C. R/w. Sec. 13 (1) (e) R/w. Sec. 13 (2) of 1988 Act. Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that A2 to A4 abetted the commission of the above offence by intentionally aiding A1 in the acquisition and possession of pecuniary resources and properties disproportionate to her known source of income as above. Hence, A2, A3 and A4 are hereby convicted for the offence punishable u/Sec.109 of I.P.C. R/w. Sec. 13 (1) (e) R/w. Sec. 13 (2) of 1988 Act.”

The Trial Court after hearing the learned counsel appearing for the accused and the learned Public Prosecutor on sentence, awarded the following sentence against the accused: “For the offence u/Sec. 13 (1) (e) R/w. Sec. 13 (2) of the 1988 Act, A1 Selvi. J. Jayalalitha, D/o. Late. Jayaram, is hereby sentenced to undergo simple 908 Spl.C.C.208/2004 imprisonment for a period of four years and a fine of Rs.100 crores. In default to pay the fine amount, she shall undergo further imprisonment for one year. For the offence punishable u/Sec. 120-B I.P.C., R/w. Sec. 13 (2) of 1988 Act, A1 is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay fine of Rs.1 lakh. In default to pay the fine, she shall undergo further imprisonment for one month. For the offence punishable u/Secs. 109 of I.P.C., R/w. Sec. 13 (2) of 1988 Act, A2 Tmt. Sasikala Natarajan, A3 Tr. V.N. Sudhakaran and A4 Tmt. J. Eavarasi are sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of four years each and to pay fine of Rs.10 crores each. In default to pay the fine amount, A2, A3 and A4 shall each undergo further imprisonment for one year. For the offence punishable u/Sec. 120-B of I.P.C. R/w. Sec. 13 (2) of 1988 Act, A2, A3 and A4 each are sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay fine of Rs.10,000/- each. In default to pay the fine amount, A2, A3 and A4 shall each undergo further imprisonment for one month. Substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently. Period of custody already undergone by the accused shall be given set off u/Sec. 428 of Cr.P.C. It is further ordered that, necessary direction shall be issued to the concerned banks to remit the proceeds of the Fixed Deposits and the cash balance standing to the credit of the respective accused in their bank account and the proceeds thereof shall be appropriated and adjusted towards the fine amounts. If after adjustment, still the fine falls short, the gold and diamond ornaments seized and produced before the Court (after setting apart 7040 grams of gold with proportionate diamond jewellery), as observed in the body of the judgment shall be sold to RBI or SBI or by public auction to make deficit of fine amount good. The rest of the gold and diamond jewellery shall be confiscated to the Government.